What's happened to the Asian Century?
Bangkok Post
February 14, 2025 17:05 JST
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The ASEAN flag is placed alongside the flags of its member countries ahead of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat in Langkawi, Malaysia, in January 2025. © Reuters |
Until recently, the "Asian Century" seemed a compelling narrative but now it is not what it used to be. It was supposed to herald a shift in global economic power from the West to the East, driven by China's rapid rise, India's economic dynamism, and the broader development of Asia. But a quarter of the way into the 21st century, the promise of Asian dominance appears less certain.
The enduring technological and economic might of the United States, coupled with its geopolitical backlash against China, has lowered expectations. While Asia remains formidable, the trajectory of global power is open and fluid, with potential dominance shifting not necessarily to any nation or region but perhaps to a non-state entity.
The historical foundation of global dominance has long been characterised by periods of stability and order, namely Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, and Pax Americana, denoting Rome, Britain and America. These eras were defined by economic and military supremacy upholding a stable international order.
The post-World War II period saw the US emerge as the chief architect of a global system that facilitated growth and development in most parts of the world. Through institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation, the US not only secured its interests but also propelled the development of other nations. However, this very success planted the seeds of challenge, as countries once considered peripheral began closing the prosperity gap with America.
The 1980s saw Japan's rise as a formidable economic power leading to a conflict with the US, which responded with trade restrictions that ultimately curtailed Japan's ascendancy. As Japan's growth slowed, the world witnessed the rapid expansion of China, especially after its accession to the WTO in 2001, further integrating it into global markets. With China's rise came the notion of "Pax Sinica," bolstered by annual GDP growth rates of 10% in the 1990s and early 2000s.
India soon followed with impressive economic strides, and the collective might of "Chindia" -- a term coined to encapsulate the growing influence of these two giants -- fuelled optimism about Asia's future as the dominant global force.
By 2020, Asia accounted for nearly half of global GDP, with a burgeoning middle class driving consumption and economic expansion. The region seemed poised to eclipse the traditional Western powers, supported by an era of globalisation that benefited Asian economies disproportionately.
But this narrative was built on fragile assumptions, namely that economic globalisation would continue uninterrupted, that major powers would remain cooperative, and that Asia could function as a cohesive geopolitical entity.
The first major disruption to the Asian Century story came with the rise of protectionism and economic nationalism, particularly during the first administration of President Donald Trump. The US-China trade war under Trump I marked a decisive shift away from the globalisation model that had allowed Asia to thrive.
Tariffs, export controls, and restrictions on technology transfers disrupted supply chains and forced companies to reconsider their reliance on China. The pandemic further exacerbated these trends, accelerating efforts to diversify production bases away from Asia. As Washington doubled down on economic containment policies against China, other economies, including those in Europe and Asia, found themselves caught in the crossfire, leading to a fragmentation of global trade networks.
The geopolitical landscape also undermined the notion of an Asian Century. Unlike Europe, which has been anchored by the Franco-German alliance within the European Union, Asia lacks a unifying political or economic bloc.
China and India have been at odds for decades, and fought an open war once, with persistent border confrontations. China and South Korea on the one hand and Japan on the other hold mutually historical enmity dating to before World War II. Democratic India and Japan make strange bedfellows in the strategic "Quad" grouping, led by the US with Australia as the fourth member.
With no other Asian major power accepted in the lead, Asean has played the central role of regional broker and bridge. The grouping of ten Southeast Asian member states had a good two-decade run after the Cold War and came up with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asean Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, and Asean Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus.
But these crucial platforms for strategic dialogue and promotion of peace and prosperity have lost momentum as Asean has been divided over the US-China conflict, China's belligerence in the South China Sea, Myanmar's military coup and civil war, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Asean can only be effective if the major powers in the area are in rough balance and at relative peace, not when the US and China are locking horns.
Another fundamental challenge to the Asian Century is the continued dominance of the West in technological innovation. While Asia has excelled in manufacturing and certain technological sectors, the most transformative innovations -- particularly in artificial intelligence, semiconductor design, and software development -- remain concentrated in the US.
The world's top billionaires, many of whom are American tech moguls, continue to shape the digital economy in ways that Asian firms have struggled to match. The rise of AI-driven automation, biotech advancements, and quantum computing suggests that the next era of dominance may not be dictated by nation states but by those who control cutting-edge technology or by the technologies themselves.
As a result, we may be entering an era of "Pax Technologica," where multinational corporations and AI systems wield unprecedented influence over global affairs.
The next 25 years will determine whether Asia can reclaim its momentum and fulfil the promise of the Asian Century. For this to happen, the region must overcome several obstacles. First, Asia must invest heavily in research and development to close the innovation gap with the West.
Second, economic integration must be deepened through trade agreements and infrastructure investments that reduce dependency on external markets.
Third, managing geopolitical rivalries will be crucial -- whether through confidence-building measures, conflict resolution mechanisms, or diplomatic engagements -- that prevent tensions from escalating into full-scale conflicts. The Asian Century is not entirely lost, but it should not be taken for granted.
The assumption that Asia's rise was inevitable has been challenged by economic nationalism, geopolitical fragmentation, and the durable strengths of Western technological leadership. While Asia remains an economic powerhouse, the region's ability to translate this into sustained global dominance is in question.
Whether the future belongs to a resurgent Asia, a revitalised West, or a new era of technologies as actors remains an open question.
SENIOR FELLOW OF THE INSTIUTE OF SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT CHULALONGKRN UNIVERSITY
A professor and senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, he earned a PhD from the London School of Economics with a top dissertation prize in 2002. Recognised for excellence in opinion writing from Society of Publishers in Asia, his views and articles have been published widely by local and international media.
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A similar article was written by the same and published in Nikkei Asia on February 10, 2025 entitled as "Is the Asian Century Over?" A similar genre of views was expressed by John West in The Globalist.com entitled "What Happened to the Asian Century?"
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