Monday, January 5, 2026

Will Hamzah take up the mantle as saviour of Malay Politics upon his return from Mekah today?

Hamzah Zainudin returns from Mekah today, and Malaysian politics pauses—briefly, dramatically, and perhaps unnecessarily—to ask a familiar question: is this the moment? 

In a political culture that has elevated airport arrivals, hospital discharges and umrah returns into moments of near-messianic anticipation, Hamzah’s homecoming is being watched like the final reel of a political thriller whose plot everyone claims to know but no one agrees on.

The speculation is simple, seductive, and dangerous: that upon his return, Hamzah will either give the green light—or slam the brakes—on a revived Muafakat Nasional, once again stitching UMNO and PAS together in the name of Malay unity, dignity, survival, or sheer desperation.

This renewed chatter is not happening in a vacuum. It is triggered by Dr Akmal Saleh’s call for UMNO to quit the Madani government—not via roof-hacking or backdoor acrobatics, but by assuming the noble posture of a “dignified opposition”. 

It is, on paper, a principled argument: UMNO cannot remain in a government allegedly crossing the 3R red lines, most notably the court’s rejection of the former Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s decree relating to Najib Razak’s sentence.

Behind that legal argument, however, sits a political truth too large to ignore: a significant segment of UMNO’s grassroots believes Najib is not merely convicted, but persecuted. Justice, to them, is no longer blind; it is selectively farsighted.

So the question is not whether Najib’s case matters—it clearly does—but whether it is a cause, or merely the latest excuse, for UMNO to escape a coalition that has become electorally radioactive among Malays.

The Mekah Silence and the Politics of Absence

Hamzah’s silence while away is precisely why it matters. He was absent during the Perlis political debacle. He was absent when Muhyiddin Yassin announced his resignation as PN chairman, conveniently while undergoing cancer treatment in London. 

Hamzah is developing a pattern: history happens while he is elsewhere, and decisions wait until he returns. Is this coincidence, calculation, or caution? 

Perhaps all three. There is also quiet talk—never confirmed, never denied—of consultation involving Hishammuddin Hussein Onn, allegedly Dubai-based, allegedly still influential, allegedly still unfinished business. 

In Malaysian politics, “allegedly” does a lot of heavy lifting.

What is clear is this: if there is an “all systems go” moment for Muafakat Nasional 2.0, it will not happen without Hamzah. Zahid Hamidi may be the supposed prime ministerial candidate in this whispered plan, but Hamzah is the switchboard operator. Without him, the lights stay off.

UMNO’s Grassroots: Angry, Confused, and Nostalgic

UMNO’s grassroots are restless. Surveys—some internal, some selectively leaked—paint a grim picture: Malay support hovering around 25%, more than half of BN voters having defected in 2022, and only about 30% of party members remaining truly loyal.

In the northern Malay states, UMNO has not merely lost—it has been erased. PAS does not compete there anymore; it governs by default.

The grassroots diagnosis is blunt: DAP is the problem. Never mind that working relationships at the top appear cordial, even functional. Decades of animosity do not dissolve through cabinet meetings. To many UMNO supporters, PH still looks like UMDAP, and UMDAP still feels like a betrayal.

On the other side, DAP’s grassroots are equally unimpressed. To them, UMNO is not a partner—it is a handicap. The Sabah state election losses, while rooted in economic dissatisfaction, are still blamed on UMDAP contamination. Perception, as always, outruns policy.

Will PAS Save UMNO—or Finish It Off?

This brings us to the central gamble: can PAS revive UMNO’s Malay support, or will it simply absorb what remains?

History offers little comfort. UMNO remembers being stabbed during Muafakat Nasional 1.0. PAS remembers UMNO’s habit of treating partners as disposable once power is secured. Trust has not recovered—on either side.

UMNO has red lines PAS is almost guaranteed to cross: Hishammuddin, Khairy Jamaluddin, Mahathir Mohamad. If Pejuang invited into PN, can UMNO ignore? 

PAS does not forgive easily, and it does not forget strategically.

Muhyiddin is a major red line for UMNO and PAS, but is no more PN chairman. However, he is still PPBM president—and still a factor. 

Relations between him and Hamzah remain unresolved. The Perlis episode strained PAS-PPBM ties, and PAS is in no hurry to accept the PN chairmanship. PAS-led PN will not be palatable to non-Malay voters. That vacuum points again to Hamzah—but Hamzah cannot move without Muhyiddin’s consent.

Malay unity, it seems, requires an extraordinary number of meetings.

Hamzah the Operator vs Hamzah the Leader

There is no denying Hamzah’s reputation as a political operator. He scripts manoeuvres well. He times announcements expertly. He understands pressure points.

But elections are not coups. Voters do not reward cleverness alone.

Hamzah carries baggage—questions of integrity, limited ministerial legacy, and little evidence of inspirational leadership. He is feared by rivals, respected by tacticians, but rarely loved by voters. 

That distinction matters when the opponent is Anwar Ibrahim, whose appeal—whatever one thinks of his governance—remains emotionally resonant.

If Zahid Hamidi is indeed the PM candidate under a revived MN, the problem deepens. Zahid against Anwar is not a contest of ideas—it is a referendum on credibility. And credibility is not something UMNO currently has in surplus.

Retirement, Renewal, and the Fantasy of Clean Slates

There is a popular fantasy making the rounds: Zahid and Hadi Awang retire gracefully, allowing figures like Mohamad Hasan, Johari Ghani, or Wan Rosdy to rejuvenate UMNO, while PAS hands over to Tuan Ibrahim.

It is a beautiful idea. It is also politically naïve.

Retirements in Malaysian politics rarely happen voluntarily, and transitions are seldom clean. Power, once tasted, is not relinquished through think-pieces.

Politics, Ruthlessly Reduced to Numbers

Dr Akmal and UMNO Youth may believe the answer is clear. Zambry Abdul Kadir is closer to reality: let the Supreme Council decide. EGM called but MIC Supreme Council still has final say on its BN withdrawal plan. 

Because beneath the ideology, outrage, and moral framing lies the brutal arithmetic of politics.

Numbers do not care about dignity.

Numbers do not reward nostalgia.

Numbers do not wait for unity speeches.

And the numbers today do not look friendly to anyone.

Hamzah’s return from Mekah will not deliver salvation. At most, it will deliver a decision—one that carries enormous risk, limited upside, and no guarantee of redemption.

Perhaps that is why he went to Mekah in the first place. Not to seek instructions, but to reflect on whether Malay politics truly needs a saviour—or simply fewer people claiming to be one.

In the end, Muafakat Nasional may yet be revived. Or it may remain what it increasingly resembles: a comforting myth for parties afraid to confront the harder truth—that the old formulas no longer work, and no single man, returning from anywhere, can change that.

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